Exploiting the natural experiment of the German reunification, we investigate how quickly economic agents learn to forecast macroeconomic variables when they find themselves in a new institutional environment. Despite the fact that convergence of inflation rates in East and West Germany was achieved by the year 1994, East Germans continue to expect higher inflation than West Germans even decades after reunification, with little sign of convergence. We provide evidence that these effects are not driven by differences in financial literacy or risk aversion, but rather operate through distrust in capitalist institutions as well as initial experiences under the capitalist system. We present evidence that higher inflation expectations can partially explain lower savings in assets with a fixed rate of return among East Germans. Our findings suggest that individuals find it difficult to adjust to a changing institutional environment in their forecasting of macroeconomic variables.
Introduction
Economic agents have to make decisions in an institutional environment that changes frequently.
Examples of institutional change include regulatory changes, technological advances, economic integration, and the transfer of autonomy over fiscal and monetary policy to supranational institutions. A growing body of evidence suggests that economic agents rely on their past experiences when forming economic expectations and beliefs (Malmendier and Nagel, 2011, 2016; Greenwood and Shleifer, 2014; Kuchler and Zafar, 2016) . However, when the institutional environment changes, past experiences may no longer provide a useful basis for the forecasting of economic outcomes.
In this paper, we examine how quickly economic agents learn to forecast macroeconomic variables when they find themselves in a new institutional environment. We exploit the natural experiment of the German reunification which exogenously and unexpectedly transformed the economic system in East Germany from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.
Specifically, inflation had been close to zero during the time of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) due to price controls. A sharp spike in the rate of inflation in East Germany occurred in the years after reunification. Convergence in inflation rates was achieved by 1994, five years after the fall of the Berlin Wall (see Figure 1 ). We use survey data on consumer expectations regarding inflation from the year 2000 onward to examine whether East Germans' inflation expectations have converged to the expectations of their West German counterparts.
The question how quickly consumers learn to forecast macroeconomic variables has important implications for understanding household behavior and for the welfare cost of shifts in the institutional environment. For instance, inflation expectations should matter for planned consumption growth through their effect on the real interest rate, and should affect the timing of purchases of durable goods. In addition, higher expected inflation reduces the perceived relative return of fixed-income securities such as bonds, and should therefore influence individuals' portfolio choice.
Forecasting inflation more accurately should therefore enable consumers to make better decisions and to achieve higher welfare. Previous literature has shown that consumers act upon their inflation expectations (Armantier et al., 2015) and that inflation expectations influence individual consumption behavior (Crump et al., 2015; D'Acunto et al., 2016) .
1 Finally, policymakers have recently turned to unconventional policy measures that aim to influence people's inflation expectations, such as forward guidance. The effectiveness of such measures strongly depends on consumers' ability to make good macroeconomic forecasts.
We find that East Germans expect higher inflation than West Germans even decades after the reunification. Our first source of data is the GfK Consumer Climate Survey, a monthly survey that measures respondents' consumer confidence and their expectations about macroeconomic and personal outcomes using qualitative questions. Figure 2 plots for each year the fractions of East and West German respondents expecting inflation to increase over the 12 months after the survey. East Germans are substantially more likely to expect inflation to increase than West
Germans. These differences remain statistically and economically significant after controlling for time fixed effects and a wide range of household characteristics. We find that the effect is stronger for females, individuals with lower education, individuals living in rural areas and cohorts who have spent more time under the communist regime. Moreover, the effect does not decline over time and differences in expectations seem to become more pronounced when realized inflation is higher.
We confirm these findings using quantitative measures of inflation expectations from the Bundesbank's Panel of Household Finances (PHF). We find that having lived under the communist regime increases expected inflation in 2014 by one percentage point. This implies that East
Germans display an even stronger upward bias in their expectations than West Germans, who expected inflation to be 2.6 percent at the time of the survey while realized inflation was below 1 percent. Even East Germans who have moved to West Germany since 1989 hold significantly higher inflation expectations than West Germans. This suggests that our findings are not driven by unobserved differences in the economic environment between East and West Germany.
We also shed light on the mechanisms behind our findings. We find that differences in financial literacy cannot explain our results. Similarly, we rule out that our findings are driven by differences in risk aversion which could alter point forecasts when economic agents predict 1 However, the existing evidence on the effect of inflation expectations on consumption behavior is mixed. For instance, Bachmann et al. (2015) and Burke and Ozdagli (2013) do not find a strong positive correlation between inflation expectations and spending.
inflation under asymmetric loss (Capistrán and Timmermann, 2009 ). We use data from the Eurobarometer surveys to show that East Germans display significantly lower trust in the ECB than West Germans, which could translate into higher expected inflation (Christelis et al., 2016) .
Finally, our findings could work through the long-lasting impact of East Germans' initial experiences of high rates of inflation under the capitalist system, after experiencing decades of virtually no inflation in the GDR. We find suggestive evidence for this channel by highlighting that East and West Germans do not display significantly different expectations regarding stock returns and interest rates. In contrast to inflation, which spiked markedly in East Germany after reunification, realizations of interest rates and stock returns did not differ between East and West after reunification.
Finally, we examine whether differences in inflation expectations are reflected in differences in behavior. We find that East Germans invest lower amounts in bonds, for which the perceived real rate of return decreases with expected inflation, controlling for wealth, income and individual characteristics. This effect becomes smaller when we control for inflation expectations, suggesting that differences in inflation expectations can explain differences in behavior between East and West Germans.
We contribute to a recent literature that uses survey data to study the formation of individuals' expectations about macroeconomic variables (Coibion and Gorodnichenko, 2015a,b; Coibion et al., 2017; Kumar et al., 2015; Mian et al., 2017; Manski, 2017; Roth and Wohlfart, 2017b,c) .
This literature has established that people's inflation expectations are affected by remembered prices from own shopping experiences (Cavallo et al., 2017) , trust in the central bank (Christelis et al., 2016) , perceived past price changes and professional forecasts .
Other papers show that individuals form their expectations about house prices based on perceived past realizations (Armona et al., 2016) , local experiences (Kuchler and Zafar, 2016) or information transmitted through social interactions (Bailey et al., 2017a,b) .
2 We contribute to this research effort by showing that shifts in the institutional environment can leave a lasting imprint on consumer expectations.
Our paper is related to Malmendier and Nagel (2016) who show that individuals who have experienced higher rates of inflation over their lifetimes forecast higher inflation. Our contribution differs from theirs in several ways: First, while they consider cohort differences in inflation experiences within the US, we examine the effect of transitioning from one economic system to another, where the change in the economic system came unexpectedly and was extremely salient to individuals. East Germans' previously experienced realizations of macroeconomic variables
should not provide a meaningful basis for forming expectations in this new environment. Second, our results differ in that we find that people who have lived under the communist regime where there was essentially zero inflation expect even higher inflation after the transition to a market economy. Our findings therefore suggest that i) the effect of experiences made in a particular institutional context may not persist in a new institutional environment; ii) initial experiences in a new environment, and how these experiences compare to experiences in the old environment, may be particularly important; and iii) extreme events and upward surprises in inflation may matter in addition to average experienced inflation rates.
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We also contribute to a broader literature that uses the German reunification as a natural experiment to study the formation of political preferences (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007) , savings behavior (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln, 2005; Fuchs-Schündeln, 2008) , the role of product familiarity in households' financial choices (Fuchs-Schündeln and Haliassos, 2015) or the consumption of status goods (Friehe and Mechtel, 2014 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on the change in the macroeconomic regime in East Germany. Section 3 describes the three datasets used in this study. In section 4 we present the main results on differences in inflation expectations between East and West Germans. Section 5 sheds light on mechanisms, while section 6 examines effects on people's behavior. Section 7 concludes.
Setting
In this section we provide some background on the economic transition in East Germany and our research design.
Economic Transition in East Germany
Germany was divided in 1949 after World War II as a result of increasing tensions between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and the US, the UK, and France on the other hand. The Federal
Republic of Germany (FRG) was founded in the area that comprised the American, British and French occupation zones and the German Democrat Republic (GDR) was founded on the territory of the Soviet occupation zone. While a capitalist market economy was introduced in the FRG, a Soviet-style centrally planned economy was installed in the GDR.
Figure 1 shows how differences in the economic systems between the two countries were reflected in differences in the evolution of inflation. Price and wage controls ensured that there was essentially zero inflation in the GDR. In contrast, prices and wages were allowed to adjust freely in the FRG, resulting in fluctuations in the rate of inflation up until seven percent during the oil price crisis in 1973. In the FRG, an independent central bank -the "Bank deutscher
Länder" from 1948 until 1957, and the Bundesbank from 1957 onwards -put a strong emphasis on ensuring price stability and was quite successful at that in comparison to other Western economies. In the GDR, prices were set by a government agency, the "Amt für Preise", since 1965
and there was no independent monetary policy by the central bank, the "Deutsche Notenbank der DDR".
The GDR joined the FRG in 1990, one year after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. The economic system in the GDR was transformed into a market economy, and the Deutsche mark was introduced as currency on 1st July 1990. Prices and wage controls were abandoned. In the years from 1990 until 1993, East Germany experienced a sharp spike in inflation. No official data are available for the years 1990 and 1991, but the rate of inflation reached 13.4 percent in 1992, while inflation in West Germany was relatively modest at 3.9 percent. Convergence in the rates of inflation was reached by 1994 and inflation rates were nearly identical in East and West Germany after that. From the year 2000 onward, only one official inflation rate was published for Germany. The ECB is designed along the lines of the Bundesbank, with a high degree of independence and a strong focus on price stability. 
Control Group and Validity of Exogeneity Assumption
We use the natural experiment of the German reunification to study how quickly economic agents learn to forecast inflation when they find themselves in a new institutional environment. To do that, we use West Germans as a control group and compare the expectations of East Germans after reunification to the expectations of West Germans. At the time of reunification, West
Germans had lived under a market economy with an independent central bank for decades, so it seems natural to take their inflation expectations as a benchmark.
In order to assess the causal effect of having lived under the communist regime on inflation expectations in reunified Germany one needs to assume exogeneity of the East dummy conditional on individual-level control variables. First, this requires that East and West Germans were similar before the two German states were founded in 1949. Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) provide evidence that regions that became part of the GDR and FRG were similar in terms of per capita income and shares of the employed population working in different industries in the time before
World War II. One particular concern is that the hyperinflation that took place in Germany between 1914 and 1923 was more intense in the regions that subsequently became the GDR than in the regions of the subsequent FRG. One could therefore wrongly attribute the longlasting memory of hyperinflation, transmitted across generations, to the effect of living under 4 Another way in which East Germans experienced a loss in purchasing power was the conversion of their savings from East German mark to Deutsche mark in 1990. While savings up to 4000 East German mark could be converted at a rate of one to one, a rate of two to one was applied to savings above this threshold.
5 See also the discussion in Berlemann and Enkelmann (2014) who examine differences in inflation aversion within Germany. the communist regime. However, the German hyperinflation led to dramatic losses in purchasing power across all parts of the country.
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Second, a potential confound in the analysis is moving activity between East and West Germany. Around 3 million individuals emigrated from East to West between 1949 and the building of the Berlin Wall in 1961. A large share of these migrants were intellectuals and entrepreneurs (Heidemeyer, 1994) . This could be a potential confound in our analysis, as these individuals may be more sophisticated on average, explaining the more accurate inflation forecasts among people living in West Germany at the time of reunification. We show that our findings are robust to controlling for the respondent's levels of education and financial literacy, so we believe that this is unlikely to be a concern in our analysis. Migration was very modest in the time after 1961 (Schumann et al., 1996; Münz and Ulrich, 1997) .
In addition, two of our datasets, the GfK Consumer Climate Survey and the Eurobarometer, 
Data

GfK Consumer Climate Survey
The GfK Consumer Climate Survey is the only larger-scale dataset that contains data on inflation expectations of German Housholds and has been used in previous research on the expectations formation process of households (D'Acunto et al., 2016 Among others, the survey contains questions on perceived past inflation and expected future inflation. Specifically, people are asked whether they expect prices to change more or less strongly over the next 12 months compared to the previous 12 months. We construct a dummy variable that takes value one if the respondent expects prices to increase by more, and zero otherwise.
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The specific wording of the outcome variables from the different datasets used in the analysis is described in section A in the online Appendix. Figure A. 1 plots the distributions of responses to the question on expected inflation among West Germans and among East Germans. As can be seen, East Germans are more likely than West Germans to expect prices to increase by more or the same as over the previous year, and less likely to expect prices to increase by less than in the previous year, or to expect prices not to change or to fall.
In our estimations we focus on individuals born in 1982 or earlier. We are interested in how quickly economic agents adapt to changes in the institutional environment, so we require that the individuals in our sample have spent some time of their economic lives in the GDR. Table 1 shows summary statistics for our working sample of 370,279 respondents without missing information in the control variables that we include in our analysis.
Panel of Household Finances
The GfK Consumer Climate Survey provides us with a large sample and reaches back until 2000, which enables us to examine heterogeneity of the effect aross demographic groups and to study how differences in inflation expectations between East and West Germans evolve over time.
However, it falls short along several dimensions. First, it only contains categorical questions on inflation expectations, and no quantitative measures. Second, while it contains information on the respondents' place of residence at the time of the survey, it does not contain any information about the place of residence before the German reunification. Moving activity therefore adds 7 Unfortunately, the microdata from earlier waves is unavailable to researchers. 8 The answer options include "Prices will increase more,""Prices will increase by the same,""Prices will increase less,""Prices will stay the same," and "Prices will decrease." We obtain very similar results if we define the outcome variable differently, for instance as "increase by at least as much". noise to this proxy for being born in the GDR. Third, the GfK data does not contain any information on the respondents' financial behavior.
We therefore turn to a second dataset, the Bundesbank's Panel of Household Finances (PHF).
The PHF is the German section of the ECB's Household Finance and Consumption Survey (HFCS) and so far has been conducted twice, in 2011 and in 2014. Around two thirds of the 3,565 households that responded to the first wave of the survey also took part in the second wave.
In addition, a refreshment sample of around 2,300 new households was added to the survey in 2014. We use data from both waves in our analysis.
Both waves of the PHF contain categorical measures of respondents' inflation expectations, which we use to generate a dummy that takes value one if the respondent thinks that prices will increase significantly, and zero otherwise. Table 2 .
The PHF deals with item non-response and otherwise missing values by providing five implicates of imputed data. Having more than one implicate for each observation allows to account for the additional variation introduced by using imputed data. We work with these data using Rubin's method (Rubin, 1987) .
12
9 Individuals are asked: "What do you think, will the general price level change in the next twelve months?" Individuals select one of the following answer options: "Increase significantly," "Increase somewhat," "Stay approximately the same," "Fall somewhat," "Fall significantly."
10 Throughout, we obtain very similar results if we use different cutoffs or winsorize the variables instead. 11 We cannot identify such individuals in the GfK Consumer Climate Survey or in the Eurobarometer surveys. 12 Specifically, we estimate each of our specifications separately for each of the five datasets and calculate the
Eurobarometer
We use data from the German subsample of the Eurobarometer surveys to examine whether lack of trust in the central bank is a mechanism behind our main findings. The Eurobarometer surveys have been conducted since the early 1970s by the Commission of the European Union.
Repeated cross-sections that are representative of the populations of the member countries have been interviewed twice per year on topics such as general political attitudes, policy preferences and attitudes towards European integration.
Among others, respondents are asked whether they tend to trust the ECB, or whether they tend not to trust the ECB. We generate a dummy variable that equals one if respondents trust the ECB, and zero otherwise. We use data from the waves conducted between 2002 and 2016 in our analysis, in line with the period in which the euro has been the single means of transaction in Germany. In line with the other datasets used, we restrict the sample to individuals born 1982 or earlier. Summary statistics for our main working sample of 41,148 respondents from the Eurobarometer are displayed in Table A1 in the online Appendix.
Main Results: Differences in Macroeconomic Expectations 4.1 Empirical Specification
We examine the effect of having spent time under the communist regime on people's macroeconomic expectations by estimating the following equation using OLS:
average over the five coefficient estimates asb = where y i,t is expected inflation of respondent i in year t, East i is a dummy for being East German, and X i,t is a vector of individual-level controls. Specifically, we control for gender, age, education, labor market status, size of the community of residence, income and wealth. Due to differences in data availability, the exact controls used differ slightly across datasets and are described in section A in the online Appendix.
Moreover, we examine whether the effect of having lived under the communist regime differs according to gender, educational attainment, living in a rural or urban area, and cohort by interacting the East i dummy with the given dimension of heterogeneity, interact i,t :
We report robust standard errors throughout the paper. 
Results on Inflation Expectations
The results from the GfK Consumer Climate survey are shown in Table 3 . As can be seen in column 1, being East German increases the probability to expect inflation to increase over the next 12 months by 5.6 percentage points. This effect is highly statistically significant and remarkably large, given that 12 percent of West Germans expect inflation to increase on average.
14 This effect is persistent over years, as illustrated in Figure 3 , which shows coefficient estimates on the East dummy obtained from estimating specification 1 separately for each year. Interestingly, the coefficient estimate has a larger magnitude in periods of higher inflation.
As shown in columns 2 to 4, the effect is larger for females, individuals with lower education and individuals living in rural areas. Column 5 examines heterogeneity according to birth cohort, where the omitted category are individuals born before 1942. We find that the effects are stronger for people born between 1943 and 1962 relative to older or younger cohorts. On the one hand, higher age could make it more difficult to adjust to the new economic environment. On the other hand, since effects are also weaker for those born before 1943, this could reflect the fact that these cohorts have spent a larger fraction of their lives under the communist regime, and therefore have greater difficulty to make forecasts in a market economy. Finally, we examine whether East Germans born after 1993, who have not lived under the communist regime and have not experienced the high inflation rates after reunification, hold different expectations than
West Germans belonging to the same cohorts. Reassuringly, the coefficient estimate on the East dummy is only marginally significant and of substantially smaller size in this sample (column 6).
The results from the PHF are shown in Table 4 . Conditional on covariates, East Germans expect almost 1 percentage point higher inflation than West Germans in 2014 (column 1) and are 8.6 percentage points more likely than West Germans to predict that prices will increase considerably across both waves (column 3). The effect of being East German on people's expected inflation rate is larger than the effect of moving from educational attainment below middle school to having a university degree (-0.82 percentage points) and the effect of being female (0.68 percentage points). 15 The average expected inflation rate among West Germans is 2.6 percent, while actual inflation over the 12 months prior to the period over which the surveys were conducted in 2014 ranged between 0.6 and 0.8 percent. Realized inflation over the twelve months after the surveys ranged between 0.2 and 0.7 percent. Therefore, also West Germans over-predicted inflation substantially.
As shown in Figure 1 , inflation rates in East and West Germany have converged by 1994, suggesting that our findings are not driven by differences in actual inflation rates in East and West. To provide an additional robustness check against this possibility, we re-run our estimations including three dummies for current region of residence (North, West and East, with South being the omitted category). Identification of the coefficient on the East dummy in these specifications comes from differences in expectations between West Germans and East Germans who have moved to West Germany since 1989, as well as from differences between East and West Germans living in East Germany. The results are shown in columns 2 and 4. The effects decrease in size, but remain large and statistically significant, suggesting that differences in actual regional inflation rates are not driving our findings. Finally, column 5 shows that higher expected inflation 15 In Table A3 in the online Appendix we display coefficient estimates on key control variables.
among East Germans is reflected in a lower expected real income growth. This does not seem to be driven by lower perceived job security among East Germans (column 6).
Additional Robustness Checks
We demonstrate that our findings are robust to a wide range of adjustments. Table A4 in the online Appendix shows a sensitivity analysis for our baseline specification from the GfK as displayed in column 1 of Table 3 . We show that our results are robust to restricting the sample to household heads (column 2) or to people born in 1972 or earlier (column 3), to using sampling weights (column 4), to changing the outcome to "inflation will not decrease" (column 5), to controlling for perceived past inflation (column 6), to excluding respondents living in Berlin (column 7), and to replacing the East dummy with separate dummies for all six East German states (column 8). Table A5 displays robustness checks for the baseline specification on the PHF sample from Table 4 column 1. Specifically, our results are robust to further restricting the age range to individuals born in 1972 or earlier (column 2), to using sampling weights (column 3), and to winsorizing expected inflation at the top and bottom percentile instead of setting these observations to missing (column 4).
Mechanisms
In this section, we shed light on the mechanisms leading to higher expected inflation among East
Germans. Specifically, we examine whether financial illiteracy, risk aversion, distrust in capitalist institutions or initial experiences under the capitalist system can explain our main findings.
Financial Illiteracy
Bruine This suggests that East Germans may have a worse understanding of economic and financial concepts than West Germans, and therefore report higher expected inflation. The PHF contains measures of financial literacy that were constructed using the three questions on interest compounding, inflation and risk diversification that by now have become standard to measure financial literacy (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2014) . We re-estimate our main specification from Table   4 column 1 controlling for dummies indicating correct answers to the three question. The results are shown in column 2 of Table 5 . The estimated coefficient on the East dummy barely changes in size and significance, suggesting that our findings are not driven by a lack of financial literacy among East Germans. Interestingly, we find that individuals who give the correct answer to the question on interest compounding expect significantly lower inflation. None of the other dimensions of financial literacy seem to matter for people's inflation expectations.
Risk Aversion and Forecasting under Asymmetric Loss
Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) Germans, forecasting under asymmetric loss could lead them to report higher point predictions of inflation. We shed light on this mechanism by re-estimating our main specification from the PHF controlling for the respondent's self-reported risk aversion, which is measured on a 10-point scale reaching from "very happy to take risks" to "highly risk averse".
As shown in column 3 of Table 5 , controlling for risk aversion leaves the estimated East coefficient unchanged in size and significance, indicating that our findings are not driven by differences in risk aversion. Interestingly, more risk averse individuals expect significantly higher inflation, in line with forecasting under asymmetric loss.
Distrust towards Capitalist Institutions
East Germans could also have a lower level of trust in capitalist institutions such as the central bank. Recent evidence suggests that lack of trust in the central bank can lead households to expect higher inflation (Christelis et al., 2016) . In order to examine whether East Germans report lower levels of trust in the central bank, we turn to our third data source, the Eurobarometer. We estimate specifications 1 and 2 using a dummy for whether the respondent trusts the European Central Bank as outcome variable. The results are shown in Table 6 .
We find that East Germans report a significantly lower level of trust in the ECB than West Germans (column 1). However, there are important differences in the patterns of heterogeneity across demographic groups compared to our main findings in Table 3 . While the effect of being East German on inflation expectations is stronger for women, for individuals with a low level of education and for individuals living in rural areas, we find opposite patterns for the effect of being East German on trust in the ECB (columns 2 to 4). Differences in the effect across cohorts are more in line with the patterns of heterogeneity in our main findings, with cohorts who have spent more time under the communist regime being more strongly affected (column 5). Finally, as in our main results, we find smaller differences in trust in the ECB between East and West Germans born after reunification (column 6).
Unfortunately, neither the GfK Survey nor the PHF contain questions on respondents' trust in the ECB. However, the PHF elicits people's generalized trust, which should explain part of an individual's trust towards the central bank. We re-estimate our main specification from the PHF controlling for the respondent's self-reported level of trust. 16 As shown in column 4 of Table   5 , the estimated coefficient on the East dummy is reduced in size only slightly, suggesting that the generalized trust component of trust to the ECB can only explain a small fraction of our findings. Respondents with a higher level of generalized trust expect significantly lower inflation, potentially through its effect on trust to the central bank.
Taken together, we interpret this evidence as suggesting that lower trust in the ECB among East Germans may be one driver of our main findings, but it leaves a substantial part of the effect unexplained.
Initial Experiences under the Capitalist System
As shown in Figure 1 , East Germans experienced a drastic increase in inflation in the years after reunification. Malmendier and Nagel (2016) find that experienced inflation rates have a strong effect on inflation forecasts of individuals in the US. For East Germans, inflation experiences could matter in a different way. After decades of no inflation at all, the sudden and strong increase in inflation immediately after reunification could have had a lasting impact on East
Germans' inflation expectations.
In order to shed light on this mechanism, we examine expectations about macroeconomic variables for which no comparable pattern occurred after reunification. Specifically, we use the PHF sample to examine expectations of stock returns and interest rates, for which realizations after reunification did not differ between East and West Germans. As shown in Table 7 , we find no comparable effect of having lived under the communist regime on individuals' expectations regarding stock returns and interest rates. This suggests that our findings on inflation expectations could indeed be driven by initial experiences under the capitalist system.
Malmendier and Nagel (2016) document that a weighted average of individuals' experienced inflation rates matter for their inflation expectations. Therefore, with respect to the findings in Malmendier and Nagel (2016), our results suggest the following: i) the effect of experiences made in a particular institutional context may not persist in a new institutional environment; ii) initial experiences in a new environment, and how these experiences compare to experiences in the old environment, may be particularly important; and iii) extreme events and upward surprises in inflation may matter in addition to average experienced inflation rates. The finding that East Germans seem to give disproportionate weight to the extreme event of inflation rates greater than 10 percent after reunification is in line with the psychological literature on availability bias in human decision-making (Tversky and Kahneman,
1973).
17 Section B in the online Appendix describes how these weighted averages are constructed.
Additional Results: Inflation Expectations and Asset Holdings
In this section we examine whether differences in inflation expectations between East and West Germans are reflected in differences in their financial behavior. Specifically, we examine whether East Germans hold less savings in assets with a fixed rate of return. Given that the nominal payoff to these assets does not vary with inflation, higher expected inflation leads to a lower expected real rate of return on these assets, and should therefore make them less attractive. We would therefore expect East Germans to invest less in assets with a fixed return.
We use the PHF data to construct a measure of savings in fixed-return assets as the sum of holdings in bonds, certificates and investment funds that predominantly invest in bonds. We consider two outcome variables: a dummy that equals one in case the households invests a positive amount in fixed-return assets and zero otherwise, and the log of the total amount held in fixed-return assets. We then regress these variables on expected inflation and an East dummy, as well as controls for income, wealth and individual characteristics. We use the same sample as in our previous estimations.
The results are shown in Table 9 . Columns 1 to 3 show results for the extensive margin of investment in bonds, while columns 4 to 6 display results for the log of total bond holdings.
Columns 1 and 4 indicate that the expected rate of inflation has a negative effect on the tendency to hold bonds, in line with differences in the expected real rate of return. According to the estimate in column 4, a one percentage point increase in the expected rate of inflation leads to a reduction in the amount invested in bonds by 3.2 percent. 18 As can be seen in columns 2 and 5, East Germans are a lot less likely to invest in bonds than West Germans. When jointly including both regressors, this leads to a reduction of the East coefficients by around 10 percent.
This indicates that roughly 10 percent of the lower bond holdings among East Germans can be explained by higher expected inflation. Given that expected inflation is measured with error,
18 This is an order of magnitude smaller than the effect of the experience-based inflation forecast on bond holdings in Malmendier and Nagel (2016). However, bond holdings are a lot less prevalent in Germany as compared to the US, with average nominal amounts equal to 26,605 dollars (in September 2007 dollars, corresponding to 19,873 2010 euros, using the exchange rate of September 2007) in their dataset, and only to around 10,470 euros (in 2010 euros) in our dataset.
this likely corresponds to a lower bound of the actual effect.
Conclusion
We use the natural experiment of the German reunification to investigate how quickly consumers learn to forecast macroeconomic variables when they find themselves in a new institutional environment, where previous macroeconomic experiences do not provide a useful basis for the formation of macroeconomic expectations. We find that even two to three decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, East Germans report significantly higher inflation expectations than West Germans, with little sign of convergence. This is despite the fact that after a spike in inflation in East Germany in the years after reunification inflation rates were almost identical in East and
West from the year 1994 onward. We show that differences in expectations are reflected in lower holdings of bonds among East Germans, in line with a lower perceived real return on these assets due to higher expected inflation.
We provide evidence that differences in inflation expectations are not driven by differences in financial literacy or risk aversion, and we find suggestive evidence that the effect could reflect lower trust in the ECB. We do not find similar effects for expected stock returns or interest rates, for which realizations did not differ between East and West after reunification. We therefore believe that our findings are most likely driven by the long-lasting impact of initial experiences of high inflation rates under the capitalist system, which seem to have permanently anchored East Germans' expectations at a high level.
In light of existing evidence that inflation expectations can affect consumption growth and portfolio choice (Armantier et al., 2015; Malmendier and Nagel, 2016; Crump et al., 2015; D'Acunto et al., 2016) , our findings indicate that shifts in the institutional environment can have substantial welfare costs. Our results also have implications for the ability of central banks to steer consumers' inflation expectations in the presence of factors that persistently anchor inflation expectations at a particular level. Finally, our findings indicate that the role of experiences in belief formation may be institution-specific, and that extreme events and upward surprises may receive disproportionate importance.
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Main Figures
• Qualitative inflation expectations: How will consumer prices evolve during the next 12 months compared to the previous 12 months? Increase more; Increase the same; Increase less; Stay the same; Decrease.
We include the following control variables: a dummy for females; a polynomial in age, dummies for educational attainment, indicating educational attainment of middle school, high school, university (below middle school being the omitted category); dummies for marital status, namely married, living as couple, separated, divorced, widowed (single being the omitted category); dummies for employment status, specifically self-employed, unemployed, in full-time education, retired, housekeeping, other employment status (in paid employment being the omitted category); log net monthly household income (using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation) as well as a dummy variable for missing income information (income is set to zero in these cases); dummies for municipality size (5,000-20,000; 20,000-100,000; 100,000-500,000; more than 500,000, with below 5,000 being the omitted category); as well as month of the interview fixed effects.
A.2 Panel of Household Finances
The wording of the outcome questions we use in our estimations on the PHF is as follows:
• Qualitative inflation expectations: What do you think, will the general price level change in the next 12 months? Rise significantly; Rise somewhat; Stay approximately the same; Fall somewhat; Fall significantly.
• Expected inflation rate: What do you think, by what percentage will the general price level (rise/fall) in the next 12 months?
• Expected stock return: What do you think, by what percentage will stock prices (rise/fall) over the next 12 months?
• Expected interest rate: What do you think, how high will interest rates in your savings accounts be over the next 12 months on average?
We include the following control variables: a dummy for females; a polynomial in age; dummies for educational attainment, indicating educational attainment of middle school, high school, university, other educational attainment, still in education (below middle school being the omitted category); dummies for marital status, namely married, separated, divorced, widowed (single being the omitted category); dummies for employment status, specifically employed part-time, on leave, unemployed, in full-time education, retired, disabled, housekeeping, other employment status (employed full-time being the omitted category); log net monthly household income and log net wealth (using inverse hyperbolic sine transformations); and dummies for municipality size (5,000-20,000; 20,000-100,000; 100,000-500,000; more than 500,000, with below 5,000 being the omitted category).
A.3 Eurobarometer
The wording of the question on trust in the ECB in the Eurobarometer is as follows:
• Trust ECB: For each of the following European institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? Tend to trust; Tend not to trust.
We include the following control variables: a dummy for females; a polynomial in age; dummies that proxy for educational attainment, constructed from a variable indicating the age at which the respondent has completed full-time education, specifically middle school (finished fulltime education between age 16 and 18), high school (finished full-time education between age 19 and 22), university (finished full-time education at age 23 or older), still in education, with below middle school being the omitted category; dummies for marital status, specifically married, single with partner, divorced, widowed, other marital status (single without partner being the omitted category); dummies for employment status, specifically self-employed, house keeping, unemployed, retired, student (in paid employment being the omitted category); and dummies for living in a small or middle size town and for living in a large town (living in a rural town being the omitted category).
B Construction of Experienced-based Inflation Forecasts
As in Malmendier and Nagel (2016), we construct a weighted average of experienced past inflation rates for each individual i in year t, using a specification of weights that introduces merely one additional parameter to measure past experiences:
where
where π t−k is the inflation rate in East or West Germany in year t-k. Following Malmendier and Nagel (2016) we assume that experiences matter from the year of birth onward.
The weights w it (k, λ) are a function of k, i.e. how distant the inflation rate was experienced relative to the individual's age at time t, and of the weighting parameter λ. Higher values of λ indicate a greater relative importance of more recent experiences compared to more distant experiences. In line with the findings in Malmendier and Nagel (2016), we calculate average experienced inflation rates using weights of λ = 1, λ = 2 and λ = 3 which give rise to weights that decrease when one moves further into the past from the survey year. Notes: All specifications control for gender, a polynomial in age, dummies for the respondent's educational attainment, dummies for marital status, dummies for employment status, the log of total net household income, dummies for municipality size, and month of interview fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. All specifications control for gender, a polynomial in age, dummies for the respondent's educational attainment, dummies for marital status, dummies for employment status, the log of net total household income, the log of total net wealth, and dummies for municipality size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. Notes: All specifications control for gender, a polynomial in age, dummies for the respondent's educational attainment, dummies for marital status, dummies for employment status, the log of total net household income, dummies for municipality size, and month of interview fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. Notes: All specifications control for gender, a polynomial in age, dummies for the respondent's educational attainment, dummies for marital status, dummies for employment status, the log of net total household income, the log of total net wealth, and dummies for municipality size. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes significance at 10 pct., ** at 5 pct., and *** at 1 pct. level. 
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